More than 10 million Tunisians have been called to cast their votes in the presidential election scheduled for October 6, 2024, amid widespread pessimism and popular frustration over the deteriorating social and human rights conditions in the country.
In stark contrast to the charged atmosphere that marked the 2019 presidential election, today, Tunisia’s streets are devoid of political vibrancy or large electoral gatherings in the major cities. Nearly everyone agrees that the incumbent president, Kais Saied, is the overwhelming favorite to retain his seat.
Over the past five years, the “man in Carthage Palace” has turned the country into a graveyard of fear and repression, says Jilali Hammami, a former member of parliament and a leader in the Workers’ Party, in an interview with Madaar.
In 2019, the Tunisian electorate placed its trust in Kais Saied, who marketed himself as an “honest” man who believed the era of political parties had “collapsed and ended.” He triumphed over the dominant political forces that had shaped the landscape since the Jasmine Revolution of 2010, which toppled Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s regime, igniting hopes for democracy, rights, and freedoms.
“We must call things by their true names,” Jilali Hammami asserts. In his view, Kais Saied is nothing more than a figurehead of the counter-revolution, who ascended to power by “capitalizing on a deceptive and false narrative.”
This success, according to Hammami, can be explained by the fact that “at the time, the other wings of the counter-revolution in power (the Ennahda Party and Nida Tounes Party alliance) were collapsing due to their own failure in governing the country post-revolution.”
Once in power, Saied embarked on a series of measures aimed at dismantling the political system born out of the post-revolutionary balance of power. He dissolved the government and parliament, conducted a referendum in 2022 on a new constitution, which he personally authored to grant himself sweeping powers, and abolished the Supreme Judicial Council.
What’s particularly alarming is that, through his “Magna Carta,” Saied imposed a presidential system that doesn’t define powers but rather roles. To him, the parliament and judiciary don’t wield authority; they merely serve functions.
Saied and his supporters argue that his overall actions aim to protect the state and combat corruption. However, his opponents see echoes of the ousted dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, whose reign was notorious for authoritarianism and severe repression.
Reflecting this sentiment, researcher Haitham Qasimi, writing for Le Monde, characterized Kais Saied as “a new dictator, another Ben Ali.”
As Saied heads into a presidential race that appears predetermined, only two additional candidates out of 17 submissions were approved, while the rest were either disqualified or imprisoned.
The first approved candidate is Zuhair Magzawi, a former parliamentarian whom observers describe as a “secondary political figure,” and who has been seen as a supporter of Kais Saied from the outset.
The other candidate is Ayashi Zamel, a liberal-leaning political activist who was arrested on the same day he submitted his candidacy last month. He was sentenced to 14 years in prison for allegedly “forging” signatures for his candidacy endorsements, though his legal situation doesn’t prevent him from running in the election.
Meanwhile, the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights, an independent and historic human rights organization, has voiced its deep concern over the erosion of freedoms in the country. The organization condemned what it described as the “weaponization of state institutions” to manipulate the presidential election process, including the refusal of the Independent High Authority for Elections of Tunisia to comply with administrative court rulings.
The Tunisian administrative court had ordered the reinstatement of three candidates who had been disqualified for “procedural” reasons. However, in early September, the Independent High Authority for Elections of Tunisia—appointed by Kais Saied—refused to honor the court’s decision.
In response, and just one week into the official election campaign, the Tunisian parliament rushed to amend the electoral law, stripping the administrative court of its authority over election matters and transferring jurisdiction to the Court of Appeal, which will now oversee election disputes and appeals.
This prompted several political forces to quickly mobilize, forming the Tunisian Network for Rights and Freedoms on September 4. The network, comprising 10 organizations and associations along with nine political parties, was established to counter what one founding member described as the “suffocation” of both candidates and voters alike, demanding respect for the right to free expression and public participation.
In its founding statement, the network accused the president of exploiting the “vast powers he granted himself through the 2022 constitution” to “suffocate freedom of expression,” “subjugate the judiciary,” and “promote a divisive political discourse laden with exclusion and racism.” The network also condemned Saied for branding his opponents as “traitors, agents, and puppets of foreign powers.”
During demonstrations organized by the network, angry protesters held up banners rejecting the amendment to the electoral law just days into the election campaign, decrying it as a “blatant assault on Tunisians’ right to choose.”
Simultaneously, Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights warns that journalists, activists, and citizens are being “intimidated” through “arbitrary arrests and legal harassment,” and again drew attention to the “unprecedented deterioration of purchasing power” and the “continuous shortage of basic goods, declining public services, and rising unemployment.”
The organization links these issues to “increasing rates of crime, depression, and drug use,” blaming the absence of “effective public policies” and the regime’s reliance on “conspiracy theories” to justify its failures.
Many Tunisians now view the pre-election measures as nothing more than a means for Kais Saied to secure another term in what they see as a “foregone conclusion.”
This bleak view of Tunisia’s current situation is echoed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which noted in a statement released in May 2024 that “growth in Tunisia remains below pre-pandemic levels,” describing it as “one of the slowest recoveries in the Middle East and North Africa.”
According to the official National Institute of Statistics, Tunisia’s unemployment rate reached 16% in the second quarter of this year, reflecting a deep sense of frustration, particularly among the youth, who bear the brunt of joblessness and are increasingly considering emigration, regardless of whether it is legal or illegal.
A recent Arab Barometer survey found that 46% of Tunisians are contemplating migration, with 71% of them aged between 18 and 29.
For many Tunisians, elections no longer represent a meaningful avenue for improving their lives, especially given the severe economic crises that have persisted throughout Saied’s presidency. Voter turnout has become increasingly scarce. During the 2022 constitutional referendum, only 30.5% of registered voters participated, while turnout plummeted to 11.3% in this year’s legislative elections. The second round of the 2023 local council elections saw only 12.44% turnout.
In this fraught political and social climate, Jilali Hammami, the Workers’ Party leader, insists that “boycott is the only correct position, not only in our view but also in the eyes of a growing segment of the population.” He added, “We can say that on election day, Kais Saied and his followers will be on one side, while virtually all other political forces, from across the spectrum, will be on the other.”
