Guayaquil, Ecuador’s most important port city, became the epicenter of the conflict in the country between drug trafficking groups that maintain alliances with international cartels. Its strategic location makes it the country’s main drug export port and one of the most important on the Pacific Ocean. In 2022, 1,537 people were murdered in Guayaquil, which equates to a homicide rate of 48 murders per 100,000 inhabitants. Mexico’s Citizens’ Council for Public Safety and Criminal Justice states that Guayaquil is one of the 24 most violent cities in the world.
In January 2024, one of these gangs entered a well-known television station in Guayaquil and, to the astonished gaze of viewers, intimidated journalists and threatened to carry out more attacks against the civilian population if the government continued with port controls and the redistribution of gang leaders to different prisons around the country. In addition, one of the most important gang leaders escaped relatively easily from prison.
In response, the right-wing government of Daniel Noboa declared an “internal armed conflict”, or internal war, which gave him more economic resources and powers to confront the local mafias, as well as more authority to the military. In addition, the declaration of internal war means that the justice system no longer sees these groups as “criminals” but as “terrorist military objectives”.
Noboa’s decision was applauded by the majority of a country that had never before faced this type of internal threat. The polls proved the president right: people wanted greater strength to confront crime. In the last popular consultation, the security-related questions proposed by the Executive won overwhelmingly. Perhaps that is why all statements by the president and his Secretaries of State focus almost entirely on vindicating the so-called “war on drugs”.
It is probably because of this impulse that the government constantly and indirectly affirms that all those who oppose its political, economic, social, etc. decisions do so because they possibly have loyal ties with those mafia groups that destroy the peace of Ecuador. On one occasion the president himself stated that it was during Correa’s government that “the narco groups began to form”.
What are the results?
The government has repeatedly claimed that the “war against drug trafficking” which has involved the the strengthening of the armed forces and the police has been a resounding success, although there is still a long way to go. A good part of the government’s political communication strategy has sought to portray President Noboa as the new Bukele, that is, as a determined and courageous character who subdues criminal groups at all costs.
On May 13, 2024, the Secretary of the Interior, Monica Palencia, stated that crime had dropped by 99% compared to the first months of the previous government of Guillermo Lasso. A few days earlier, Palencia stated that there was a 26% reduction in violent deaths in Ecuador, as well as a decrease in kidnappings for ransom, which, according to her, “allows us to say that we have been successful in a strategy implemented by the police leadership”.
However, the data Palencia is talking about has not been shared in the usual way. The Executive withdrew most of the data on homicides and robberies in Ecuador from the government’s web pages. Thus, journalists and those interested in the issue must wait patiently for government authorities to hold a press conference and share data that, for some unexplained reason, they do not share on their websites as do police forces in other countries. In fact, this has been the communication strategy concerning security on the part of the Noboa government: to this day it is not known for sure what the almost secret “Phoenix Plan” of security consists of, nor its guidelines, objectives, sources of financing, among other essential information.
But, there are other sources that talk about the rate of homicides, kidnappings, robberies, etc. For example, the Institute of Studies and Training in Integral Security states that more than 9,800 incidents of extortion were reported up to June 15, 2024, which implies that this type of crime increased by 138% concerning 2023 (and that only reported kidnappings are taken into account, so there is an underreporting of this crime). And while between January and February 2024, just after the declaration of internal war, homicides decreased, between February and June 2024, violent deaths increased by 61% compared to February of the same year. During June, the bloodiest month so far in 2024, 592 murders were reported. As the graphs show, the trend is upward in terms of violent deaths.
On the other hand, the data must be read taking into account the mutability of the conflict. If one takes into account a single city like Guayaquil, for example, there may be a decrease in certain crimes in some parts of the city. But in recent months the fight between the gangs has shifted to other locations, such as Manabí and Los Ríos, provinces where there were already territorial disputes, but which in recent weeks have intensified.
The number of murders has increased in 16 of Ecuador’s 24 provinces. For example, Azuay, a province in the south of the country that had not experienced the levels of violence suffered by Guayas or Esmeraldas, has experienced in recent weeks hours of real panic, especially in a place called Camilo Ponce Enriquez, where one of the criminal groups seeks to control the illegal mining business.
For now, it doesn’t appear that the government is going to clarify the discrepancies between its data and that offered by other public entities. In the upcoming election year, Daniel Noboa will probably continue to claim that the “Phoenix” security plan has been a complete success and that some of his political “enemies” are supported by criminal forces. Noboa has already used the security issue to promote a popular consultation in which, as already mentioned, he won in most of the questions related to security, although he had a hard defeat in two questions on economic issues that sought to promote his neoliberal agenda. It is worth noting that the results promised by Noboa if he won the popular consultation have yet to be seen.
This already indicates that Noboa’s political strategy will be based on taking advantage of his strong discourse against crime to gain popularity. However, both the data and the reality in the streets and in the most conflictive neighborhoods undermines that narrative. For now, it does not appear that the power of the gangs is diminishing, but rather that they have adapted to the new circumstances, although this may not be recognized by the President or his cabinet.
