For years Qatar has been a key place in the Arab world for Syrian refugees and opposition figures. Decades before Syria’s civil war erupted, Doha became home to Syrians fleeing the Assad regime, going back to the 1982 Hama massacre. Therefore, there was naturally much jubilation across the Qatari capital after news broke earlier this month that President Bashar al-Assad’s government fell.
Doha is now poised to play a significant role in post-Assad Syria. Qatar invested large sums of money into armed groups fighting to topple Assad at earlier stages of the conflict. In early 2012, Qatar’s then-emir even advocated that Arab militaries directly intervene to bring down Syria’s regime.
However, Qatar stopped giving rebel factions material support years ago. This stemmed from Doha coming to terms with Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015-16, Qatar’s interests in improving relations with Iran during the Emirati- and Saudi-imposed 2017-21 blockade, and reputational blowback resulting from Doha’s (real or perceived) links to violent extremists in Syria.
Nonetheless, after severing diplomatic relations with Damascus in July 2011, Doha never again recognized Assad’s government as legitimate—a stance at odds with most other Arab capitals.
Convinced that Assad was not going anywhere anytime soon, a host of Arab states renormalized relations with Damascus in the late 2010s and early 2020s. The United Arab Emirates took the lead on this front, restoring formal ties with Syria’s government in December 2018, hosting Assad in Abu Dhabi and Dubai beginning in March 2022, and serving as a hub for Arab renormalization with Damascus in the years that followed. Yet, Qatar firmly stood against rehabilitating Assad, refusing to restore official ties with his regime. At the May 2023 Arab League summit in Jeddah—the first one attended by Assad since the body suspended his country in 2011—Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani walked out before Syria’s then-president spoke, making Doha’s position crystal clear.
Assad’s ouster was a vindicating moment for Qatar’s government, which believes that its perseverance paid off. Officials in Doha always argued that Syria would not stabilize without Assad’s government making drastic reforms and concessions which were total non-starters for the Damascus regime. Assad’s fall affirmed the Qatari leadership’s conviction that it had been on the ‘right side of history’ in Syria.
Looking to Syria’s uncertain future
Setting Qatar’s relationship with post-Assad Syria off to a positive start is a priority for Doha. While providing Syrians with humanitarian assistance, officials in Doha have been in contact with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—a former al-Qaeda offshoot which was the dominant faction in the coalition of groups that just overthrew Assad’s government. Doha established the first line of communication with HTS following Assad’s ouster.
On December 11, Qatar announced plans to reopen its embassy in Damascus with its operations resuming six days later. The Saudi, Turkish, Russian, and Iranian foreign ministers agreed at the Doha Forum, held December 7-8, that Qatar is most qualified to lead outreach efforts to HTS mindful of Doha’s rigid anti-Assad stance throughout the Syrian conflict.
Additionally, Qatar has already been serving as a backchannel between HTS leader Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa (a.k.a. Abu Mohammed al-Golani) and Tehran, underscoring Doha’s potential to be a diplomatic bridge between Syria’s new authorities and the governments which were Assad’s allies.
Despite supporting the Syrian opposition during Assad’s final 14 years in power, the Qatari leadership is not in a celebratory mood. The formal statements coming from the Doha government have a cautious tone, warning of the risks of renewed conflict and chaos, condemning Israeli aggression against post-Assad Syria, and calling for implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254.
Qatar will now seek opportunities to assert influence in the ‘New Syria’ albeit in ways that reflect Doha’s quest to avoid being seen as disregarding fellow Arab governments’ interests and threat perceptions. Whereas Doha’s Islamist-friendly foreign policy in the 2010s ruffled many feathers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), especially with Abu Dhabi, Qatar will want to cooperate (not clash) with other Gulf Arab monarchies vis-à-vis post-Assad Syria. Doha learned many lessons from the 2017-21 blockade and is now highly determined to avoid upsetting its relationships with fellow GCC members.
Furthermore, with countless uncertainties ahead—both in terms of Syria’s future and the next four years of US foreign policy with President-elect Donald Trump soon returning to the White House—Doha wants to avoid being perceived by the incoming US administration as supporting Islamic “extremism” or “terrorism” in Syria. Rather than coming across as if Qatar is backing any particular actor in Syria, Doha’s message is that it supports the Syrian people and is committed to respecting their will. This position will secure Doha flexibility when navigating Syria’s post-Assad political landscape. It’s also a stance that is difficult for western statesmen to criticize.
Eyeing a strategic energy corridor
Energy ambitions are relevant to the picture. If Syria can stabilize in the future, a dormant plan to connect Qatar’s natural gas fields to the European Union (EU) could possibly be revived. Known as the Qatar-Turkey pipeline project, this plan entails the transportation of Qatari natural gas via a pipeline going through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria to Turkey, which, as an energy hub, would connect to the rest of Europe.
This plan was initially conceived in 2009, two years before the Syrian crisis erupted. But Assad’s government rejected it, purportedly to serve Moscow’s interests in protecting Russia’s EU-bound gas exports. Only two days after Assad’s ouster, Turkey’s Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar voiced Ankara’s openness to reviving this dormant Qatar-Turkey natural gas pipeline project.
“If Syria achieves its [territorial] integrity and stability,” Bayraktar affirmed that this pipeline project could be revisited. “If so, that line must be safe. We hope it will be so. If so, there are many projects to produce,” added the Turkish minister. Noting the extent to which electricity is lacking in Syria, Bayraktar said, “We need to look at how we can turn energy into a tool to meet these needs.”
Possible channel between Washington and Damascus
Qatar could find itself as a vital bridge between HTS and Trump’s administration, perhaps somewhat similarly to Qatar’s role as the chief interlocutor between Western governments and the Taliban. If Washington does not remove the HTS terror listing in the immediate future and is consequently restrained in its ability to directly engage Damascus’s new authorities, the White House might find Doha’s position helpful to US interests.
Nonetheless, Trump 2.0’s approach to Syria is under a huge question mark. Whether the incoming US administration and Qatar will see eye-to-eye on Syria remains unclear. With Doha seeking to play a significant role in the war-torn country’s redevelopment and reconstruction, Syria-related sanctions and terror designations could be some of the most sensitive issues that Qatar and the US discuss early on in Trump’s second term.
There is no doubting that challenges lay ahead for Syria. Policymakers in Doha and basically all other Arab capitals have concerns regarding Syria’s uncertain future and the myriad risks of instability and conflict. Nonetheless, of all Arab states, Qatar is least troubled by the HTS-led overthrow of Assad’s government. Instead of seeing post-Ba’athist Syria from a threat-prism, the leadership in Doha is cautiously optimistic, viewing Syria’s complicated situation as a unique opportunity.
Giorgio Cafiero (@GiorgioCafiero) is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics (@GulfStateAnalyt), a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy. He is also an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.
