In the May 25 elections, Venezuela’s ruling coalition, the Gran Polo Patriótico (Great Patriotic Pole), won the vast majority of votes, thus achieving an important victory over a fractured opposition with little negotiating power.
Although a sector of the opposition, led by far-right figure María Corina Machado, called for a boycott of the elections, several opposition parties chose to participate in the legislative and regional electoral process. They won some seats and secured 1 of the 24 governorships (Cojedes State), while the remaining 23 went to Chavismo.
Chavismo won
Before the election, Chavismo governed in 20 states. Now, in addition to winning 23 governorships – including the newly created one for the Essequibo, a region historically disputed with Guyana – the Great Patriotic Pole has secured 253 seats in the National Assembly. In contrast, the opposition barely obtained 32 seats. Among them are the former governor, former presidential candidate, and notorious opposition candidate Henrique Capriles as well as the opposition and former presidential candidate Henri Falcón.
In short, according to the National Electoral Council (CNE), Chavismo received 82.68% of the valid votes for the National Assembly while the opposition, divided into two coalitions, obtained 6.25% and 5.17%, respectively.
Following the landslide victory, President Nicolás Maduro reaffirmed: “After 32 elections, amid blockades, criminal sanctions, fascism, and violence, today we demonstrate that the Bolivarian Revolution is stronger than ever.”
Why was the opposition so severely defeated?
The most important factor in the overwhelming defeat of the opposition is its call for abstention, which was criticized by the sector of the opposition that decided to participate. Overall, the opposition was deeply divided and lacking a unified command center, which profoundly undermined its vote. In addition, it is important to note that the opposition that did participate was split into two alliances, which also diminished its capacity to win.
Doubling down on her abstentionist approach, Machado posted on X: “On May 25, Venezuelans complied with the sovereign mandate of 28 [July], in a historic act of conscious and courageous disobedience.”
According to her, 85% of the population did not turn out to vote, a number that would support her argument of massive civil disobedience. However, the CNE reported that 6 million people participated, 28% of the electoral roll and, according to the CNE, 42% of active voters, which openly contradicts the figures repeated by the abstentionist opposition in the international media.
On the other hand, Chavismo spent months preparing for the elections under a unified operations center that mobilized its base to turn out to the polls en masse. Chavismo thus managed to secure most of the electoral seats being contested without the presence of a strong opposition.
Responding to the opposition’s argument that voter turnout was very low, journalist Roger Harris counters that “turnout was typical for a non-presidential election and at the same percentage as the US midterm elections.” He notes that the pro-government coalition actually received more votes than in previous regional contests, adding: “The Chavista core of older and working-class women remains strong.”
Harris clarified that CNE president Elvis Amoroso’s reference to “active voters” meant those still residing in the country. “Due to the large number of recent emigrants, a significant number are registered but cannot vote because they are abroad,” he said.
According to Harris, it wasn’t overall turnout but rather the opposition’s vote that was remarkably low – partly because a major section called for a boycott. However, he also points to corruption scandals: “The opposition had been discredited by revelations that some had received and embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars from USAID.” More than ever, he argues, the opposition presented itself “negatively to the wider electorate”, at a time when most Venezuelans seem more interested in ending partisan conflicts and continuing the country’s slow economic recovery.
Despite the support behind the Bolivarian project, Harris warns that many challenges lie ahead: rising inflation, currency instability, and continued US hostility. Venezuela, he argues, remains surrounded by threats to its steady progress, while Washington debates “whether to give the Bolivarian revolution a quick or slow death. Either way, destabilization efforts continue.”
