ELN Commander Pablo Beltrán discusses the road to peace in Colombia

The guerrilla commander spoke about how paramilitarism and US imperialism serve as major obstacles to true peace in Colombia

February 14, 2024 by Luis De Jesus Reyes

The Government of Colombia and the National Liberation Army (ELN), the largest leftist guerrilla group in the country, signed an agreement on February 5 to extend, for another six months, the bilateral ceasefire approved in August of last year in Havana.

The delegations met again in Havana, Cuba for the sixth cycle of peace talks, part of a dialogue process to eventually draft up peace accords and move towards a possible end to the armed conflict they have had for nearly six decades.

Pablo Beltrán, commander of the ELN and head of the guerrilla delegation, spoke to Breakthrough News, about the peace process, the obstacles it faces, Cuba’s role in the dialogues, the threats posed by the United States military presence in the region, and more.

Watch here: Commander of ELN Guerrillas speaks: Will there be peace under Petro? What is the US after?

Luis de Jesús: First of all, Commander, thank you very much for being here with us in Breakthrough News. I’ll start by asking you. An extension of the ceasefire has just been signed. Many would say that this is a new advance, both for Colombia and for the ELN, and also for Cuba, as it is the host country. How do you see it?

Pablo Beltrán: Well, since President [Gustavo] Petro became president, we began a negotiation process that has now completed a year and a half. In the last six months we managed to carry out a ceasefire, which expired precisely yesterday the 5th [of February] and which, after a very intense evaluation, we decided to extend for another six months. It is an extension that goes until August 3.

Yes, there have been quite a few problems. We have been dealing with several of them. We have taken measures to adjust standards, do some investigations, and other more operational measures. And the evaluation shows that, although there were difficulties, it is a positive element for the peace process and that, including the remedies we want to strengthen it, it is worth extending it and that was what we decided yesterday.

LDJ: You say there were many obstacles along the way. In fact, we’ve heard that an additional week was necessary to extend the talks a little to reach the extension. What was left in the pipeline?

PB: Well, we have said that the ceasefire resisted, in our case, four major threats. First, there were attempts from different sectors, including the State, to remove factions from the ELN. We reject that because if we are in a ceasefire, how are you going to promote the dismantling of the ELN. Second, we have resisted attacks against members of the ELN National Directorate, at this time of extension, of ceasefire.

Third, in several regions of Colombia, half a dozen regions, there have been attacks by paramilitary groups with omission or connivance with sectors of the state Armed Forces. And fourth, in areas where the ELN was traditionally present, there have been deployments of state military forces and cantonment in places where they were not before. So, there is kind of a constraint. If you look at the universe of attacks, it seems like there was no ceasefire.

So we summoned the Minister of Defense of Colombia, he was here in Havana for three days, we were analyzing these problems. He is going to try, through his management, to see how these problems are going to be resolved, because what this is about is seeking joint solutions to the problems that the ceasefire has.

LDJ: There are several vital points in the conversations. Perhaps, for the agreement of this particular extension, there was the issue of kidnappings by the ELN, which was one of the things that the delegation of the Government of Colombia said the most. 

PB: Well, this is a cessation of the beginning, that is, it is not a cessation for the end of the conflict, it is a cessation of the beginning, which we seek to consolidate in the list of prohibited actions to make the cessation more effective. So, on this occasion we said we have no problem, as a unilateral and temporary decision, of course, while the ceasefire [is in force], to stop making those retentions for economic purposes.

What does that mean for us? Actually, in all the regions where we are present we charge taxes. So, for people who do not pay these taxes, we temporarily deprive them of their freedom. So, it means that we stop applying that coercive factor, but it [also] means that for the entire ELN plan there must continue to be those contributions.

LDJ: Now, going on the Government’s side, you mentioned it this morning at the press conference and you just mentioned it a few minutes ago: the issue of attacks by paramilitary groups. You have denounced in the past that these groups are in collusion or that they act under the leadership of the Colombian military forces. If you could tell me, how do you evaluate the official position of the Government in this situation? And is there any chance of this being resolved in the next six months of extension?

PB: Well, paramilitarism is the weapon par excellence of counterinsurgency. In the words of a former head of the United Nations Mission in Colombia, “paramilitarism is equal to perfidy,” which is that the State operates against opposition groups, such as our case, through other [groups], in order not to assume responsibilities. That is paramilitarism, which has been a very old State doctrine.

But, despite the prohibition, since the 90s until now a modality that we call narco-paramilitarism developed, which are large cartels, which in turn have military squads. One of them explained how he related to the army and said: “I, the brigade commander, paid 40 million pesos a month and I killed three or four and offered them to him as false positives so that he would stick out his chest and say ‘see, I killed four guerrillas.’” That’s the kind of symbiosis there is.

LDJ: Commander, isn’t it a bit contradictory that the Petro government, which encouraged this type of dialogue from the beginning, is allowing, or is permissive with, this type of acts, when it is going to a negotiating table, precisely to end with this?

PB: There are things in life that one wants and things that one can [do]. We think that it is not that the Government is permissive, but that it is a State dynamic that comes as a doctrine and later has ended up becoming a custom. A soldier said “for us paramilitaries this is like when one has a lover: one has her, but one denies her.” They’ve said that themselves. So, of course, it is not just a doctrine, but it is already the culture of the State, how it attacks left-wing and opposition groups. And from there come the forced displacements, the execution of leaders, the dispossession.

So, that is an arm of the war against the insurgency in Colombia, against the popular leaders. Petro came into the government and found that. He appointed a Minister of Defense who is a very prestigious jurist and we have no doubt about his good faith and good will. The problem is that he has found a whole structure in place.

LDJ: Commander, President Petro has said repeatedly, in fact, he said it here last year, when he came for the signing of the ceasefire, that he aspires for total peace with the ELN to be signed by 2025. Do you share his vision?

PB: We just had a cycle in Mexico, which ended in December, and we touched on a point called Process Horizon and the message is that we are going to try to make as much progress as possible with this Government. What does that mean? That we are putting the accelerator on this, but if we start saying that before Petro leaves in August 2026 this has to be ready, suddenly we might make a promise that cannot be sustained.

So, we better choose to make the commitment we made: we are going to conscientiously accelerate this so that it advances as much as possible. That is the commitment.

LDJ: Now, while Colombia is making all these efforts to reach a peace agreement with the ELN, there are other paramilitary groups on the sidelines of all this. One of the biggest debates that Colombian society is experiencing today, and perhaps the rest of Latin America as well, is how to reach a peace agreement with so many groups.

PB: I’m going to tell you an anecdote. In the Colombian region near Darién, called Urabá, we once did a teleconference with leaders of Afro communities, and a woman, who is very famous, stood up and asked us if the ELN is going to do the same as the FARC. What thing, I ask her? If they are going to leave dissident groups behind, that what they are doing to us is harm. And that is a legitimate claim.

In other words, if a peace process leaves residuals that become an unmanageable problem, then that is recycling the violence, right?

I responded that everything the ELN does at this table comes as a product of a prior consensus with all fronts. In other words, this delegation of dialogue does not come here to speak on behalf of individuals, what it brings is a consensus.

When this is done in this way and everything that is brought here is discussed democratically, it means that everyone’s agreement is guaranteed, that is, zero dissent.

LDJ: Commander, but it was also thought that there was a consensual plan when the peace agreement was reached with the FARC. I ask you, is there a risk within the ELN that there will later be dissidents?

PB: For example, at this moment there are sectors of the State promoting dissidents in the ELN and we denounced it. Here we have a table, why do you try to undermine the ELN under the table? So, we have that under evaluation.

LDJ: And what has been the Government’s response?

PB: It started by having one part of the State doing one thing and another doing another thing. We told them, we want to have a single interlocutor, one in which we can trust, but not one with whom we trust and another who conspires [against us]. We made that claim in this cycle, we are going to wait until the solution progresses.

LDJ: Commander, while you are in an arduous struggle to reach a peace agreement, in the rest of the region other situations are occurring that could make us think that the region is heading towards new conflicts. Let’s hope not, but for example, we have seen the militarization of another country recently. In the case of Ecuador, the arrival of Laura Richardson, the head of the United States Southern Command, who has come to provide her “selfless” help to Latin America and Ecuador to combat the mafias. How do you in the ELN see this situation?

PB: I’m going to tell you the full story. There was a president named Lenín Moreno. We had a dialogue table there [in Ecuador] and one day he said on television “I am no longer a guarantor of the Colombian peace process and you have to leave.” That’s how we got here to Havana, where they gave us accommodation.

What did Lenín Moreno start? Two things: a process of right-wing, of reversing everything that the Government of [Rafael] Correa had done; but the most serious thing is that he began to undo the path of sovereignty that Ecuador had gained with Correa and began to remake old military, police, judicial and security treaties with the United States.

What was the excuse? The invasion of drug trafficking gangs from Colombia to Ecuador and the entire Ecuadorian Pacific was filled with these gangs. Today we realize that much of this mafia colonization process was induced and, in one way or another, the United States was behind it. That’s called creating problems to sell security. That was applied to Ecuador.

Today they are debating again to reinstall United States military bases in Ecuador. All the police and military treaties that Correa broke [with the US] have already been remade. They created that chaos and they have just declared that there is an internal armed conflict and that is false. What there is is a fight with common crime, that is not a political conflict. It is the same case as Mexico. Mexico never declared that there was an internal armed conflict. It is a problem of mafias, of cartels.

But that gives them two guarantees: they can request military aid from the United States, massively; and second, they can pass many more laws restricting the opposition by martial law. They control the opposition and flood Ecuador with more military and police treaties with the United States. That’s what Mrs. Richardson’s visits to Ecuador are for.

LDJ: You talk about United States military bases in Latin America. In Colombia there are still a few.

PB: There are 12 and they are trying to create a new one on a paradise island in the Pacific called Gorgona, which is a national natural park. The US Marine Corps already has docks and facilities built there. And environmentalists ask: how so? Where did that come from? Who left that installed? It was [Iván] Duque, the previous President.

It is Petro’s turn to address that.

LDJ: Do you think that, in the event of a major conflict in Latin America, the United States could use its preferential space in those Colombian bases to, from there…?

PB: They are already doing it. For example, the main Colombian police academy serves as training for all police forces on the continent, and it is the same training carried out by the School of the Americas. They moved many of those things there. Military operations against Venezuela, who [carries those out]? Bands and groups orchestrated from Colombia.

Now it has occurred to the United States that it is going to take care of the Amazon, when precisely the nine countries of the Amazon have said that it is everyone’s reserve and we Latin Americans have the capacity to take care of that. We do not need any outside power to come and say that it will take care of it for the good of humanity. The United States is drooling over the Amazon. So, Mrs. Richardson’s first trips to Colombia were that reason, [say] to help take care of the Amazon.

As we say in Colombia, cuéntame una de vaqueros (now tell me something really crazy). Who believes that?

LDJ: And what do you think should be Colombia’s official position in this situation?

PB: Petro has a problem. There are many things he does that America tolerates. In another time, they would have already overthrown him. And there are other things in which, in one way or another, due to the correlation of forces, Petro cannot fight with the United States. So there is a mixed situation.

Hence Petro’s positions on Gaza. Look at an ironic thing. When Petro said denounced the genocide in Gaza, the Zionists who rule Israel said “we will not sell you any more weapons and security resources”. And guess what Mrs. Richardson said the next day: “don’t worry, I’ll sell them to you”. There is a division of labor.

So, it’s a complex relationship. In some things, the United States adapts to what Petro does and in others, vice versa.

LDJ: But, what then should be the official position of the Colombian Government?

PB: As I told you before, there are things that one wants and there are things that one can [do]. Suppose, in the best of cases, that Petro wants to do more, but the correlation of internal forces does not allow it. For example, the entire judicial, military, police, and security apparatus is monitored, penetrated, and entrenched in the United States.

How is the police governed in Colombia? From the FBI. How is the Attorney General’s Office governed? From the Department of Justice. Who manages all military relations? The Pentagon? It’s a decades-long situation. It is a very serious situation.

LDJ: How, then, can Latin American countries combat this process of neoliberalism, of new military invasions that we are experiencing and that seem to be a little more underhanded? There are those who would say that this can only be combated through armed struggle, but at the same time we are experiencing processes, for example, peace processes in Colombia.

PB: What to do? Let me talk to you about Colombia. In 2021, there was a social uprising. People got tired of hunger, misery, and repression. The Government was going to approve new taxes and [the situation] exceeded all security and defense mechanisms. People took to the streets to protest and that torrent of change is what elected Petro. Petro is in debt to that.

What is the way? Continue generating and organizing the popular struggle so that it is a strong mechanism of pressure and change. I am not telling you that the ELN is going to solve Colombia’s problems. No, we encourage people to have a process of mobilization for changes and we are committed to that.

LDJ: And finally, Commander, we are in Havana, where the ceasefire agreements were first signed on August 3, 2023. Six months later we returned here to sign this ceasefire extension. What does it mean for the ELN that Cuba is the guarantor country and host country of such a complex process but at the same time so positive for your country?

PB: Cuba has distinguished itself in recent decades by unrestrictedly supporting the Colombian peace process. That is recognized by all the presidents, from left, right and center. And of course, there have been critical moments. When a right-wing government in Colombia told Cuba: there is a delegation of peace negotiators there, hand them over. Cuba told him “no, sir, they are peace negotiators, we are guarantors.” Norway told him the same thing. You cannot ignore international law.

Cuba’s refusal to give in to this claim of violating international law –which is why they are guarantor countries– led Duque to ask [Donald] Trump to impose new sanctions on Cuba.

Note that Cuba’s principled position, both internationalist and attached to international law, has had a high cost, but Cuba still maintains a State policy of support for the peace process.

I once told President [Miguel] Díaz-Canel that it is amidst the difficulties that one really knows one’s true friends. That is what Cuba has done, maintaining an invariable position as a state and support for the Colombian peace process.

LDJ: Do you think that Colombia has thanked Cuba enough for that position, for which it is paying a high price?

PB: When Petro’s government was just elected, a delegation came here with the Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva. Leyva said that Colombia has to begin a compensation process. I understand that in the Government there is this will to compensate for the efforts and I think that there have been some important steps to improve relations between the two States, between the two peoples, which is the best way for there to be compensation and a recognition of Cuba’s efforts for peace in Colombia.

LDJ: And finally, if Cuba were not a guarantor country, if Cuba had not made all its efforts, all these years, what do you think the peace process would have been like until now? Not only with the ELN, but also with the FARC.

PB: I give you our example. Can you imagine that we would have continued with the negotiating table in Ecuador after Lenin Moreno arrived. Where would I be? In a prison in the United States. Because for this you have to have principles. That no matter what pressures there are, you put principles first. That is what has been a guarantee for a process like that of the FARC and now with us.